Farmers' motivations to reduce their use of pesticides: a choice experiment analysis in France by Chèze, Benoît et al.
HAL Id: hal-01800261
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01800261
Submitted on 21 Jan 2020
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Farmers’ motivations to reduce their use of pesticides: a
choice experiment analysis in France
Benoît Chèze, Maia David, Vincent Martinet
To cite this version:
Benoît Chèze, Maia David, Vincent Martinet. Farmers’ motivations to reduce their use of pesticides:
a choice experiment analysis in France. 4ème Conférence annuelle de la FAERE, French Association
of Environmental and Resource Economists, Sep 2017, Nancy, France. ￿hal-01800261￿
Farmers’ motivations to reduce their use of
pesticides: a choice experiment analysis in France
Benoit Chèze, Maia David, Vincent Martinet∗
May 2, 2017
Abstract
This article presents the results of a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE)
survey conducted among a hundred French farmers from June 2016 to Febru-
ary 2017. Respondents had to choose between conserving their actual farm-
ing practices or change towards a reduced use of pesticides. Thanks to this
stated preference method, we analyze the factors influencing farmers’ mo-
tivations to reduce -or not- their use of pesticides, we estimate the relative
weight of these factors and we value the willingness to accept/willingness to
pay for changes in each of these factors. Our contribution relies on includ-
ing, besides other attributes, the role of the harvest-risk in farmers’ decisions
towars pesticides. Our results indicate that the most important attribute
in the farmers’ decisions making is the "risk of poor harvest" followed by
the kind of "administrative commitment". Regarding the former attribute,
farmers express high preferences for not bearing a risk of loss: they need
to receive on average 100.89 euros (107.64 euros) per hectare and per year
to compensate the utility loss associated with the risk of encountering one
(two) additional year(s) of poor harvest.
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1 Introduction
Reducing the use of pesticides has become a major challenge in developed coun-
tries’ agriculture. As shown by the recent extremely rapid growth of organic farm-
ing (+ 20% of sales in France in 2016), consumers are now aware and demanding
on this issue.
Public policies have developed for the last ten years to attempt to provide ad-
equate incentives to change behaviors and boost research on this topic. Several
farming practices have now proven efficient to maintain satisfactory yields while
reducing the use of chemicals ((Lechenet et al., 2017)). Reducing pesticides could
reduce farmers’ costs, improve their health and environment and prevent resistance
((Wilson and Tisdell, 2001; Bourguet and Guillemaud, 2016)). However, up to
now, results have been disappointing. Between 2008 and 2015, farmers’ consump-
tion of chemical inputs has increased in Europe (+10% in France over this period)
and there is a lack of participation in agro-environmental schemes in this field.
What are the main obstacles that prevent farmers from adopting low-pesticides
practices that could be win-win strategies? There is a demand from researchers
in ecology and agronomy towards economists to understand the socio-economic
factors that explain farmers’ behavior.
Our work contributes to this question by exploring the factors influencing farm-
ers’ choice to change their farming practices towards a reduced use of pesticides.
Several socio-economic analyses have examined the motivations and obstacles to
the adoption of environmentally friendly practices by farmers, using various meth-
ods.Contrarily to most of them, we use a quantitative approach, in order to esti-
mate the relative weight of various decision factors and to provide farmers’ willing-
ness to pay (WTP)/ willingness to accept (WTA) for changes in these factors. Our
methodology is based on non-market valuation, using a discrete choice experiment
(DCE).
The DCE method has increasingly attracted the attention of environmental
economists for the last ten years, as shown by their considerable recent use (see
Hoyos (2010) for a survey). It is a stated preference method in which preferences
are elicited through repeated fictional choices made by respondents. Compared to
other non-market valuation methods, DCEs have the advantage of capturing the
non-use value1 and of taking into account several characteristics, or attributes, of
the considered issue. It thus procures a WTP/WTA for each of these attributes
rather than a global WTA/WTP as a contingent valuation would do. It is partic-
ularly useful to shed light on the trade-offs that occur in a problem or a decision-
making. In our case, we wish to understand the factors influencing farmers’ choice
1The non-use value of non-market goods is the existence value or bequest value. It is for
instance useful when valuing issues linked to biodiversity.
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and the relative weight of these factors. We also wish to measure the WTA/WTP
for changes in each of these factors. For these reasons, the DCE seems particularly
appropriate to reach our objective.
Among the main drawbacks of the method, DCEs may induce some cognitive
difficulties (Hanley et al., 2002) as the questionnaire may be heavier than for a
contingent valuation and it implies more complex econometric estimations. We
kept vigilant on both these points.
The DCE approach has previously been used to examine farmers’ choices to
adopt environmentally friendly practices. Depending on the article, the adoption of
the alternative practice can occur within ((Khuffus et al., 2014; Christensen et al.,
2011; Broch and Vedel, 2012; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; Ruto and Garrod, 2009;
Hudson and Lusk, 2004; Peterson et al., 2015)) or independently of ((Beharry-Borg
et al., 2013; Jaeck and Lifran, 2014; Birol et al., 2006; Vidogbena et al., 2015)) an
agri-environmental contract with public authorities.
Regarding the specific issue of a reduced use of pesticides, to our knowledge,
less than ten DCEs have been published. Christensen et al. (2011), for example,
analyze Danish farmers’ motivation to sign subsidy schemes for pesticide-free buffer
zones. They show that the contract’s flexibility is a major decision criteria. Khuffus
et al. (2014) look into French wine-growers’ decision to sign an agri-environmental
scheme in which the payment is partly individual and partly based on a collective
result (i.e. there is a bonus payment if the number of participants is above a given
threshold). They show that farmers value positively the collective component of
the contract. Jaeck and Lifran (2014) study rice-grower’s choice to reduce their
use of chemical inputs in Camargue (France) and show how targeted contracts are
needed given farmers’ heterogeneity.
Globally, the literature shows that the commitments’ flexibility and the po-
tential administrative burden are two major components of farmers’ decision to
change their practices. However, only very few contributions have looked into the
role of risk in farmers’ choices. Price-risk and harvest-risk are two factors that can
drastically affect farmers revenues. In particular, a change in the use of pesticides
can have major impacts on the stability of yields and many farmers actually use
pesticides as a form of harvest insurance. As explained by Lechenet et al. (2017),
"the transition towards low-pesticides farming strategies might be hampered by
the uncertainty behind any deep change (...). Risk aversion may be a hindering
factor".
Hudson and Lusk (2004) examines the role of the price-risk but the harvest-risk
is even more at stake when considering the use of pesticides. Our analysis includes,
besides other attributes, the role of the harvest-risk in French farmers’ decisions
to reduce -or not - their use of pesticides.
We first describe, in section 2, our methodology, including the experimental
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design and data collection. We then describe, in section 3, the econometric models
associated to the DCE approach. Section 4 presents our main results and their
interpretation. Conclusions and discussion are developped in section 5.
2 Methodology
The choice experiment approach relies on economic theory of consumer choice and
non-market valuation. In a DCE survey, respondents have to make choices be-
tween several options defined by their attributes (i.e. fundamental characteristics
of the respondents’ situation). Several choice sets are typically presented to re-
spondents, each composed of three options: the situation if nothing is changed
(i.e. the satus quo) and two fictional options. Respondents then choose their fa-
vorite option among these three. An option is defined by a set of attributes taking
different values according to the option. One of these attributes usually represents
the monetary contribution of the respondents. Other attributes can include envi-
ronmental or social implications of the considered issue. See Louviere et al. (2000)
for a detailed description of the method.
The discrete choice modeling framework provides the advantage to vary si-
multaneously several attributes of the considered issue. By doing so, it reveals
more detailed information than other stated preference methods such as contin-
gent valuation. Especially, it allows to estimate the marginal rates of substitution
between the different attributes. When one of the attributes is a cost (a price),
these marginal rates of substitution can be interpreted as the WTP (or the WTA)
for changes in the attributes’ levels (see Section 4.3).
In our case, respondents were farmers who had to choose between conserving
their actual farming practices or changing their practices towards a reduced use of
pesticides.
2.1 Choice of the attributes and their levels
A first step was to choose the attributes composing the options, and their associ-
ated levels. As explained by Hanley et al. (2002), the number of attributes must
be limited so as to avoid the cognitive burden of making too complicated choices.
The selection of the attributes was based on the state of the literature, discussions
with experts in agronomy, ecology and agricultural economists, focus groups with
farmers and pre-tests of some choice sets.
As shown in Table 1, the chosen attributes are:
1. The farmer’s yearly profit (or gross margin) per hectare: this attribute is
given by the average profit per hectare and per year of the farm, in euro.
This is the monetary attribute. The profit varies with a change of practice
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due to several factors including the impact on yields, on pesticides’ expenses,
on public aids, on the sales price, etc. It is expressed as a variation compared
to the status quo, taking the following values: -50 e, +0e, +50e, +100e.
2. The risk of poor harvest: given by the number of years out of ten years
for which the farm’s harvest is drastically and exceptionally reduced (i.e.
reduced by at least 30%) compared to a normal year. This poor harvest is
due to diseases, pests, weeds, etc. This attribute is expressed in additional
years with poor harvest with the new practice compared to the status quo:
+0, +1 year, +2 years
3. The administrative framework of the change of practice: describing whether
the change is coming along with any administrative commitment. This com-
mitment can imply a public aid or higher sales price (included in the mar-
gin, i.e. first attribute) but may also bring some administrative burden.
This attribute is qualitative and is expressed as the additional commitments
compared to status quo: "no additional administrative framework", "signing
an agri-environmental contract with public authorities" (with specification),
"joining a Charter" (inducing no contractual specification and a flexible com-
mitment), "entering a certification process" (associated with a specification,
controls and a green label).
4. Impact on health and the environment: this attribute indicates how the
exposure to harmful substances for health or the environment is reduced
with the change in practice. It can take the following values: -0%, -20%,
-50% -80% compared to the status quo.
Attribute Description Levels
Profit Variation in the average -50 e; + 0 e (SQ);
yearly gross margin per hectare +50e; +100e
Harvest Risk Variation in the number of +0 year (SQ); +1 year;
years with poor harvest out of 10 years +2 years
Administrative Administrative framework of the change None (SQ); Chart;
framework in practice, if any Contract; Certification
Impact on health Exposure to harmful substance for -0% (only SQ); -20%,
and environment health and the environment -50%; -80%
SQ: level in the status quo (but also possible in the other options)
only SQ: level only possible in the status quo option
Table 1: Attributes and levels
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Figure 1 shows an example of a choice set (in French) where the first column
gives the attribute’s title and short definition and the three following columns
represent the three options among which the respondent must choose (the last
column being the status quo).
Figure 1: Example of a choice set
2.2 The experimental design
The aim of the experimental design is to select the options (i.e. the combinations
of attributes’ levels) that are presented to respondents. With four attributes and
three to four levels each, the questionnaire would be far too heavy if all the possible
combinations of attributes’ levels were submitted to respondents’ choice. In order
to choose the most relevant choice sets, that is those yielding maximum information
on respondents’ preferences, we use experimental design techniques (see Louviere
et al. (2000) and Street et al. (2005)) and the dedicated Ngene software, which is
a reference in this field. It provides a statistically optimal sub-set of the possible
combinations using a Bayesian D-optimal design, in our case a fractional factorial
efficient design2.
This experimental design led to 16 different choice sets which were blocked into
two groups in which respondents were randomly assigned, as is usual. As a result,
the final questionnaire presented 8 choice sets to each respondent, which represents
an acceptable cognitive load.
2Details on the characteristics of the efficient design used and the associated program are
available upon request.
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2.3 Presentation of the questionnaire and data collection
The questionnaire was designed to last less than 20 minutes. A first part was
dedicated to general questions regarding the farmer’s activity, the size of the farm,
the use of pesticides and the actual level of the attributes in the respondent’s
case. The aim of the survey was then shortly described using illustrated slides and
describing in detail the four attributes. We were very careful so as tho deliver an
objective and neutral information.
The eight choice sets were then presented and the respondent was asked to
pick his/her favorite option. The order of the choice sets was randomized so as to
avoid having a potential declining concentration (last choices) always affecting the
same choice set. The respondent could click on the i icon (see Figure 1) in order
to obtain additional explanations. In order to detect protest answers, farmers
choosing unchanged practices in all choice sets were asked the reasons of their
choice.
After the choice sets came some final questions on the socio-demographic sit-
uation of the respondent (income level, gender, age, level of education) and on
his/her understanding of the choice sets.
The survey was held from June 2016 to February 2017, taking two forms:
face-to-face interviews directly on the farms and a websurvey. We were careful
to give very similar information in both types of interviews. We obtained in
total 100 answers from French farmers whose location, activities and main socio-
demographic characteristics are described in section 4.1.
3 The choice experiment approach and the differ-
ent econometric models
The choice experiment modeling framework relies on the characteristics theory of
value (Lancaster, 1966) and the random utility theory (McFadden, 1974). Different
econometric models are used to analyze the discrete choice data, depending on the
assumption made on the unobserved components of the random utility, i.e. the
assumption on the distribution of its error terms.
3.1 Theoretical foundations of the choice experiment ap-
proach
Lancaster (1966) assumes that a good may be defined by its own characteristics.
The value of a good therefore consists of the sum of the value of all its charac-
teristics. Applying this theory in a choice experiment approach, this means that
each attribute is associated with a utility level and that the (indirect) utility of
7
each respondent n for an alternative i in a choice set C, Vn,i is derived from its K
attributes, that is the sum of the utilities obtained from each of the K attributes.
Typically the representative utility of an alternative i for respondent n is specified
to be a linear-in-parameters function:
(1) Vn,i = V (Xi, Zn) =
K∑
k=1
βikxik+
A∑
a=1
αanzan ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N} ; ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , I}
where Vn,i is supposed to be a function of the observable i) K attributes of the
alternative i, Xi, and ii) the A characteristics of the n-th respondent, Zn.
For his part, McFadden (1974) proposes to consider that individuals make
choices according to a deterministic part along with some degree of randomness.
Combining theories of both Lancaster (1966) and McFadden (1974), we assume
that the random utility of the i-th alternative for each individual n, Un,i, is com-
posed of a deterministic component,Vn,i = V (Xi, Zn), and a stochastic element,
n,i:
(2) Un,i = V (Xi, Zn) + n,i
where the error term n,i is a random variable that captures the unsystematic and
unobserved random element of individual n’s choice (Hanley et al., 2005; Holmes
and Adamowicz, 2003; Louviere et al., 2000).
Assuming the rationality of individuals, respondents are thus supposed to asso-
ciate each alternative i with a utility level Un,i and choose the option that provides
them with the greatest utility. It comes that an agent n will choose an alternative
i from a finite set of alternatives C if its indirect utility of i,Un,i, is greater than
the indirect utility he could have derived from any other alternative j, Un,j:
(3) Un,i > Un,j ⇒ Vn,i + n,i > Vn,j + n,j ∀ j 6= i; i, j ∈ C
The probability that an individual chooses alternative i is the same as the
probability that the utility of alternative i is greater than the utility of any other
alternative of the choice set (Adamowicz et al., 1998). Following Train (2009), the
probability that an agent n chooses alternative i in a choice set C is:
Pn,i = P {Un,i > Un,j ∀ j 6= i; i, j ∈ C}(4)
⇔ Pn,i = P {Vn,i + n,i > Vn,j + n,j ∀ j 6= i; i, j ∈ C}(5)
⇔ Pn,i = P {n,j < Vn,i − Vn,j + n,i ∀ j 6= i; i, j ∈ C}(6)
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3.2 The different econometric models
Different discrete choice models are obtained from different assumptions about the
distribution of the random terms.
3.2.1 The conditional logit (CL) model
If we suppose that unobserved components, the error terms n,i, all independently,
among the N agents and between the I alternatives, follow a standard Gumbel
distribution3, we have specified a conditional logit model (or multinomial logit
model).
Since the unobserved components are independent, we can multiply Eq. (6) to
obtain the probability of individual n choosing alternative i, conditional on n,i:
Pn,i|n,i =
∏
j 6=i
P {n,j < Vn,i − Vn,j + n,i}(7)
=
∏
j 6=i
e−e
−(Vn,i−Vn,j+n,i)(8)
Pn,i is then obtained with the integration of Pn,i|n,i over the distribution of the
unobserved components:
(9) Pn,i =
∫ (∏
j 6=i
e−e
−(Vn,i−Vn,j+n,i)
)
e−n,ie−e
−n,i
dn,i
Calculations then lead this expression to simplify in
(10) Pn,i =
eVn,i∑
j e
Vn,j
where Pn,i only depends on observable components.
An important drawback to this model is that β is considered fixed across all
individuals, while we can expect the preferences to vary among the respondents.
Two other important drawbacks are the hypothesis of independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) and uncorrelated unobserved components.
3The n,i are supposed to be Independent and Identically Distributed (IID) and to follow a
type I extreme-value distribution. Then the cumulative distribution function and the density
function of each n,i are F (n,i) = e−e
−n,i and f(n,i) = e−n,ie−e
−n,i , respectively.
9
3.3 The random parameter logit (RPL) model
The random parameter logit model (McFadden and Train, 2000; Train, 2009), also
called the mixed logit model, solves these three issues. In this model, the prefer-
ences parameters β are allowed to vary across individuals; only their distribution
needs to be known. As such, for a given β we can define the logit probability :
(11) Ln,i(β) =
eVn,i(β)∑
j e
Vn,j(β)
If f(β) is the density function describing the distribution of preferences over indi-
viduals, we get back to
(12) Pn,i =
∫
Ln,i(β)f(β)dβ
which is the probability of interest.
4 Results and interpretation
Recall that we want to analyze farmers’ motivations to reduce their use of pes-
ticides and to estimate the monetary value associated with the farmers’ various
decision factors. The DCE presented in the previous section has been conducted
among a hundred farmers who had to choose between conserving their actual farm-
ing practices or changing their practices towards a reduced use of pesticides. After
removing protest answers, we finally obtained 1992 choices elicited from 83 respon-
dents. We first describe this sample in Section 4.1 and then analyze in Section
4.2.2 the discrete choice data collected by estimating two types of econometric
models: the conditional logit (CL) and the random parameter logit (RPL).
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 and Table 2 present some descriptive statistics for the final sample com-
posed of 83 respondents (39% of women). The respondents’ ages range from 23 to
68 years, with an average of 46 years. The mean area of their agricultural exploita-
tions is about 117 hectares but there is a great disparity among them, as showed
by the standard errors of the annual turnover and gross margin per hectare. Some
other descriptive statistics are presented in the Appendix.
4.2 Econometric models
The results of both the CL and RPL estimates for the sample are presented in Table
4 and Table 5. Before presenting these results in Section 4.2.2, we have to specify
10
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
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the model specifications which have been retained to estimate the econometric
models.
4.2.1 Model specifications
According to Eq. (2), the random utility of the i-th alternative for each individual
n, Un,i, is composed of a deterministic component,Vn,i = V (Xi, Zn), and a stochas-
tic element, n,i. It has already been explained how the econometric models (CL
and RPL) actually depends on the assumption on the distribution of error terms
n,i.
Before estimating these models, one also need to specify the deterministic part
of the utility function, Vn,i = V (Xi, Zn). The linear specification is often chosen
in the literature as it is the most simple one to work with.
Moreover, an Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) term is included to capture
the (systematic) effect of unobserved influences (omitted variables) on the utility
function. The ASC is modelled as a dummy that takes the value 0 if one of the
hypothetical alternatives is chosen and 1 if ‘none of these’, i.e. the status quo
alternative, is chosen. Thus, the ASC defines a situation with "no variation of the
farmer’s yearly gross margin per hectare", "no additional years with poor harvest",
"no additional administrative framework" and "no reduction of the exposure to
harmful substances for health or the environment". A positive and statistically
significant ASC would indicate strong preferences for no additional conservation.
It would suggest the existence of some omitted variables that have a positive effect
on the farmers’ utility of choosing to keep their actual farming practices.
Hence, the model is specified so that the probability of selecting a particular
farming practice scenario i is a function of attributes of that alternative and of the
alternative specific constant. We thus assume that the utility Vn,i is an additive
function. Eq. (2) becomes:
(13) Un,i = ηASC + βi,1xi,1 + βi,2xi,2 + βi,3xi,3 + βi,4xi,4 +
A∑
a=1
αanzan + n,i
where Z ′n = (z1n, . . . , zan, . . . , zan) represents the vector of the A socio-demographic
characteristics of the n-th respondent. xi,1, xi,2, xi,3 and xi,4 correspond to the dif-
ferent level taken by the attributes "Gross margin", "Risk of poor harvest", "Ad-
ministrative commitment" and "Health and environmental impacts", respectively.
Note that in our case, "Gross margin" is the payment attribute. Thus specified,
β′ = (βi,1, βi,2, βi,3, βi,4) coefficients quantify the influence which the various levels
of the four attributes exert over the utility that farmers associate with the I dif-
ferent alternatives available, relative to the utility of the "status quo" option that
appeared on every choice card.
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Regarding X ′i = (xi,1, xi,2, xi,3, xi,4), the attributes can be specified as discrete
or continuous variables and it is possible to combine qualitative and quantitative
attributes in the same model specification.
4.2.2 CL and RPL models results
Two models specifications has been chosen here. Table 4 presents the results for
the CL (column (1)) and the RPL model (column (2)) when all attributes are spec-
ified as continuous variables whereas in Table 5, only the payment attribute (Gross
margin) and the "Health and environmental impacts" attribute are modelled as a
continuous variable. The two other attributes ("Risk of poor harvest" and "Ad-
ministrative commitment") are modelled as effect-coded dummy variables.
Table 4: Results of the CL and RPL models (first models specification)
In both Tables, the RPL model is preferred to the CL model according to its
highest value of the log-likelihood function. Moreover, recent applications of the
13
Table 5: Results of the CL and RPL models (second models specification)
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RPL model have shown that this model is superior to the CL model in terms of
overall fit and welfare estimates (Lusk et al., 2003). For all these reasons, we focus
our interpretations on the results of the RPL models in both Table 4 and Table 5.
According to McFadden and Train (2000), the RPL is a highly flexible model that
can approximate any discret choice model. Compared to the CL model, it relaxes
the independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) hypothesis of the multinomial
logit by allowing the random components of the alternatives to be correlated, while
maintaining the assumption that they are identically distributed (Greene, 2008).
Hence, some parameters of the vector β are assumed to be randomly distributed
in the population rather than fixed as in the usual multinomial logit model.
Here, all the parameters except the payment attribute4 are specified to be nor-
mally distributed, and distribution simulations are based on 1000 draws to estimate
their respective mean and standard deviation. The assumed normal distribution
of the random parameters is one way to model heterogeneity in preferences. The
normal distribution is symmetric and unbounded. So the use of this distribution
means that we make a priori no assumption on farmers’ preferences: positive as
well as negative parameter values may be taken, in order to capture the heterogene-
ity in the population. Fixing the payment attribute coefficient, on the contrary,
ensures that all respondents have a positive coefficient, in our case, so that the
estimated WTA will be normally distributed (see Section 4.3 for more details).
Regarding the results of the RPL estimations, standard deviations of a major-
ity of the coefficients are significant, indicating that a RPL provides a significantly
better representation of the choices than a CL5 as it shows that there is heterogene-
ity among respondents around the mean. This indicates that the data supports
choice specific unconditional unobserved heterogeneity for these attributes and
some respondents might prefer lower levels of these.
Except for the "Health and environmental impacts" attribute, all the coeffi-
cients of the RPL model presented in both Tables 4 and 5 are statistically signif-
icant and have the expected sign. To our great astonishment, the coefficient of
"Health and environmental impacts" attribute, even though negative, is not statis-
tically significant at the 10 % level in both RPL models. The reduction of exposure
to harmful substances for health or the environment seems to have no effect on
the farmers’ utility. The coefficient of the ASC is negative but not statistically
significant in Table 4. In Table 5 however, its coefficient becomes statistically sig-
nificant at the 10% level and remains negative. Combined with the latter result
on the non-significance of "Health and environmental impacts" coefficient, it in-
dicates that there are some variables that are not included in the model, which
induce farmers to prefer to change their actual practices to reduce their use of
4And those associated with socio-demographic variables.
5Recall that a CL assumes that coefficients are the same for all respondents.
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pesticides rather than conserving their actual farming practices.
In Tables 4 and 5, the sign of the payment attribute coefficient (Gross margin)
in both RPL models is statistically significant at the 10% level and the 5%, respec-
tively. Its positive sign was expected as it indicates that the effect on respondents’
utility of choosing from a finite choice set an alternative with a higher average
yearly profit per hectare is positive.
In the first model specification (Table 4), the "Risk of poor harvest" and "Ad-
ministrative commitment" attributes are modelled as continuous variables. Both
coefficients are negative, meaning that an increase in harvest risks or in admin-
istrative commitments reduce the repondents’ utility. Interestingly, respondents
associate any additional administrative framework coming with a change of prac-
tice as higher administrative burden rather than as a beneficial accompanying
measure.
In Table 5 on the contrary, the two latter-mentioned attributes are modelled as
dummy coded variables: attributes are encoded using i) two dummy-coded vari-
ables per level ("+ 1 year" and "+ 2 years") for the "harvest risks" attribute and
ii) three dummy-coded variables per level ("Charter", "Contract" and "Certifi-
cation") for the "administrative commitments" attribute6. All dummy variables
are statistically significant and negative, confirming estimate results obtained for
the first model specification (see Table 4). However, this second model speci-
fication tends to indicate that there are no linear effect in the "administrative
commitments" attribute. In Table 5, the coefficients of "Charter", "Contract"
and "Certification" correspond to the variation in utility due to an additional
administrative framework taking the form of these three kinds of commitments,
respectively, compared to the status quo situation, i.e. "no additional adminis-
trative framework". In absolute terms, the coefficient of "Contract" (−0.527) is
superior to the "Charter" coefficient (−0.431) but inferior to the "Certification"
one (−0.519). Curiously, "signing an agri-environmental contract with public au-
thority", such as a MAEC contract, is actually perceived by respondents as worse
than "entering a certification process" (yet associated with a specification, controls
and a green label).
4.3 Willingness to accept estimates
As mentioned in Section 2, welfare measures can be determined in the form of
marginal WTP/WTA, by estimating the marginal rate of substitution between
the change in an attribute under consideration and the marginal utility of income
represented by the coefficient of the payment attribute, βpay. The latter is assumed
6Thus defined, the excluded levels for each variable – which are tied to the ASC – are "no
additional years with poor harvest" and "no additional administrative framework", respectively.
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constant as is common in the literature (Hensher and Green, 2003).
Table 6 reports the marginal WTA values for each of the attributes estimated
in both RPL models using the Wald procedure (Delta method). The Delta method
stipulates that the WTA for a unit change of a given attribute can be computed as
the marginal rate of substitution between the quantity expressed by the attribute
in question and the payment attribute (Louviere et al., 2000). Since utilities are
modelled as linear functions of the attributes, the marginal rate of substitution
between two attributes is the ratio between the coefficients7:
(14) WTAk = −dxpay
dxk
= − dU/dxk
dU/dxpay
= − ∂V/∂xk
∂V/∂xpay
= − βk
βpay
When attributes are modelled as effect-coded dummy variables, but the pay-
ment attribute, the WTA associated with each attribute k and each level l becomes:
(15) WTAlk = −
βlk
βpay
where βlk are the estimated parameters, which measure the variation of the utility
associated with a variation of the attribute k from the status quo level to the level
l. WTAlk then represents the willingness to accept to move from the status quo
level of attribute k to a level l.
Since the RPL model assumes i) the payment attribute is a fixed parameter and
ii) other attributes’ coefficients are normally distributed, WTA are then normally
distributed, as linear combinations of normal random variables. We then have the
convenient result that:
(16) E[WTAk] = −E[βk]
βpay
(17) E[WTAlk] = −
E[βlk]
βpay
For comparisons, estimates presented in Table 6 were calculated using both
RPL models. The first lines correspond to WTAs computed from the RPL model
estimates presented in Table 4 whereas the last lines correspond to WTAs com-
puted from the RPL model estimates presented in Table 5. The estimated standard
deviations and confidence intervals around the mean of the WTA estimates are
obtained using the Krinsky and Robb parametric bootstrapping method (Krinsky
and Robb, 1986).
7It should be noted that the derivative of the unobserved part of the utility function is
supposed to be zero with respect to both attributes.
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Table 6: WTA estimates
In calculating a WTA, it is important that both parameters used in the cal-
culation be statistically significant, otherwise no meaningful WTA measure can
be established. Recall that in both RPL models, the coefficient of "Health and
environmental impacts" attribute is not statistically significant at the 10 % level.
Not surprisingly, estimated coefficients and standard deviations lead to negative
lower bounds of the confidence intervals for this attribute.
Regarding the other attributes, mean WTA estimates are systematically lower
for the first model specification (Table 6, first lines) than for the second one (Table
6, last lines). Moreover, whatever the model specification retained, when the
payment attribute is used as the normalizing variable, the most important attribute
is the "risk of poor harvest" followed by the kind of "administrative commitment".
Indeed, the mean WTA of the former and the latter attributes are respectively
equal to 56.82 and 29.24 in the first model specification and are ranging from 100.89
to 107.64 and from 70.48 to 86.20 respectively in the second model specification.
Focusing on the second model specification, a second lesson is obtained from the
comparison of the "Risk of poor harvest" attribute dummy coded levels. According
to our results, farmers need to receive on average 100.89 euros per hectare and
per year to compensate the utility loss associated with the risk to encounter one
additional poor harvest. In the meantime, they need "only" to receive seven euros
more than this amount (107.64 euros per hectare and per year) to compensate the
utility loss associated with a risk multiplied by two. Actually, farmers express high
preferences for not bearing a risk of loss. One or two additional year(s) out of ten
of poor harvest are equivalent, meaning it is having a risk of loss that is important
in their decision.
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5 Concluding remarks and discussion
This article proposed to investigate farmers’ motivations to reduce their use of
pesticides and to evaluate the willingness to pay and/or to accept (WTP/WTA)
to change their actual farming practice.
To better understand farmers’ decision factors and the relative weight of these
factors, we chose to apply a discrete choice experiment (DCE) approach. Globally,
the literature shows that the flexibility of their decisions and the administrative
burden are two major components of farmers’ decision to change their practices.
However, only very few contributions have looked into the role of risk in farmers’
decisions. Price-risk and harvest-risk are two factors that can drastically affect
farmers revenues. In particular, a change in the use of pesticides can have major
impacts on the stability of yields and many farmers actually use pesticides as a form
of harvest insurance. Regarding the specific issue of a reduced use of pesticides,
to our knowledge, very few studies proposed to examine the role of the risk in
farmers’ decision making. Our contribution offers to fill this gap by including,
besides other attributes, the role of the harvest-risk in French famers’ decisions to
reduce -or not - their use of pesticides.
A DCE survey has thus been conducted among a hundred farmers from June
2016 to February 2017. Respondents had to choose between conserving their actual
farming practices or changing their practices towards a reduced use of pesticides.
After removing protest answers, we finally obtained 1992 choices elicited from 83
respondents. Each alternative of the choice set was a function of four attributes;
namely "Gross margin", "Risk of poor harvest", "Administrative commitment"
and "Health and environmental impacts".
Two models specifications have been specified. In the first model specifica-
tion, all attributes are specified as continuous variables. In the second model
specification, only the payment attribute (Gross margin) and the "Health and en-
vironmental impacts" attribute are modelled as a continuous variable. The two
other attributes ("Risk of poor harvest" and "Administrative commitment") are
modelled as effect-coded dummy variables. Both model specification are estimated
using Conditional Logit (CL) and Random Parameter Logit (RPL) econometric
models.
Except for the "Health and environmental impacts" attribute, all the coeffi-
cients of the RPL models are statistically significant and have the expected sign.
Regarding other attributes, both "Risk of poor harvest" and "Administrative com-
mitment" attributes’ coefficient are negative, meaning that an increase in harvest
risks or in administrative commitments reduce the repondents’ utility. Interest-
ingly, respondents associate any additional administrative framework coming with
a change of practice as a higher administrative burden rather than as a beneficial
accompanying measure.
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When looking at the WTA estimates, the use of the payment attribute as the
normalizing variable shows that the most important attribute in the farmers’ deci-
sions making is the "risk of poor harvest" followed by the kind of "administrative
commitment". Regarding the former attribute, our results indicate that farmers
express high preferences for not bearing a risk of loss. One or two additional
year(s) out of ten of poor harvest are equivalent8, meaning it is having a risk of
loss that is important in their decision.
Last but not least, to our great astonishment, the coefficient of "Health and
environmental impacts" attribute is not statistically significant at the 10 % level
in both RPL models. The reduction of exposure to harmful substances for health
or the environment seems to have no effect on the farmers’ utility. The coeffi-
cient of the ASC however, in the second specification estimated thanks to a RPL
model, shows that there are some variables that are not included in the model,
which induce farmers to prefer to change their actual practices to reduce their
use of pesticides rather than conserving their actual farming practices. Combined
with the latter result on the non-significance of "Health and environmental im-
pacts" coefficient, it indicates that we have to go further in the analysis. One
solution may be to include interactions of respondent-specific social, economic and
attitudinal characteristics with choice specific attributes and/or with ASC in the
utility function. Another solution would be to estimate a Latent Class Model as
an alternative model for accounting for preference heterogeneity.
8According to our results, farmers need to receive on average 100.89 euros (107.64 euros) per
hectare and per year to compensate the utility loss associated with the risk to encounter one
(two) additional years of poor harvest.
20
References
Adamowicz, W., Boxall, P. C., Williams, M., and Louviere, J. (1998). Stated
preference approaches for measuring passive use values: Choice experiments
and contingent valuation. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 80(1).
Beharry-Borg, N., Smart, J., Termansen, M., and Hubacek, K. (2013). Evalu-
ating farmers’ likely participation in a payment programme for water quality
protection in the UK uplands. Regional Environmental Change, (13):633–647.
Birol, E., Smale, M., and Gyovaii, A. (2006). Using a choice experiment to estimate
farmers’ valuation of agrobiodiversity on Hungarian small farms. Environmental
and Resource Economics, (34):439–469.
Bourguet, D. and Guillemaud, T. (2016). The hidden and external costs of pesti-
cide use. Sustainable Agriculture Reviews, (19):35–120.
Broch, S. W. and Vedel, S. E. (2012). Using choice experiments to investigate the
policy relevance of heterogeneity in farmer agri-environmental contract prefer-
ences. Environmental and Resource Economics, (51):561–581.
Christensen, T., Pedersen, A. B., Nielsen, H. O., Mørkbakand, M., Hasler, B., and
S.Denver (2011). Determinants of farmers’ willingness to participate in subsidy
schemes for pesticide-free buffer zones — A choice experiment study. Ecological
Economics, 70.
Espinosa-Goded, M., Barreiro-Hurlé, J., and Ruto, E. (2010). What do farmers
want from agri-environmental scheme design? A choice experiment approach.
Journal Agricultural Economics, 61(2).
Greene, W. (2008). Econometric Analysis. Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 6-th edition.
Hanley, N., Adamowicz, W., and Wright, R. E. (2005). Price vector effects in
choice experiments: an empirical test . Resource and Energy Economics, 27.
Hanley, N., Wright, R., and Koop, G. (2002). Modelling recreation demand using
choice experiments: Climbing in scotland. Environmental and Resource Eco-
nomics, 22(3):449–466.
Hensher, D. A. and Green, W. (2003). The mixed logit model: the state of practice.
Transportation, 30(2).
Holmes, T. and Adamowicz, W. (2003). Feature based methods. In Champ, P. A.,
Boyle, K. J., and Brown, T. C., editors, A primer on nonmarket valuation.
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
21
Hoyos, D. (2010). The state of the art of environmental valuation with discrete
choice experiments. Ecological Economics, 69(8):1595–1603.
Hudson, D. and Lusk, J. (2004). Risk and transaction cost in contracting: re-
sults from a choice-based experiment. Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial
Organization, 2(1).
Jaeck, M. and Lifran, R. (2014). Farmers’ preferences for production practices:
a choice experiment study in the Rhone river delta. Journal of Agricultural
Economics, (65(1)):112–130.
Khuffus, L., Preget, R., and Thoyer, S. (2014). Individual preferences and collective
incentives: what design for agri-environmental contracts? The case of wine-
growers’ herbicide use reduction. Review of Agricultural and Environmental
Studies, (95(1)):111–143.
Krinsky, I. and Robb, A. L. (1986). On approximating the statistical properties
of elasticities . The Review of Economics and Statistics, 64.
Lancaster, K. (1966). A new approach to consumer theory . Journal of Political
Economy, 74(2).
Lechenet, M., Dessaint, F., Py, G., Makowski, D., and Munier-Jolain, N. (2017).
Reducing pesticide use while preserving crop productivity and profitability on
arable farms. Nature Plants, (3):170 08.
Louviere, J., Hensher, D., and Swait, J. (2000). Stated choice methods : analysis
and applications. Cambridge University Press.
Lusk, J. L., Roosen, J., and Fox, J. A. (2003). Demand for beef from cattle
administered growth hormones or fed genetically modified corn: a comparison
of consumers in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States .
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 85 (1).
McFadden, D. (1974). Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behaviour.
In Zarembka, P., editor, Frontiers of econometrics. Academic press, New York.
McFadden, D. and Train, K. E. (2000). Mixed MNL models for discrete response.
Journal of applied Econometrics, 64.
Peterson, J., Smith, C., Leatherman, J., Hendricks, N., and Fox, J. (2015). Trans-
action costs in payment for environmental service contracts. Amercian Journal
of Agricultural Economics, (97(1)):219–238.
22
Ruto, E. and Garrod, G. (2009). Investigating farmers’ preferences for the de-
sign of agri-environmental schemes: a choice experiment approach. Journal of
Environmental Planning and Management, 52(5).
Street, D. J., Burgess, L., and Louviere, J. J. (2005). Quick and easy choice sets:
constructing optimal and nearly optimal stated choice experiments. Interna-
tional Journal of Research in Marketing, (22):459–70.
Train, K. E. (2009). Discrete choice methods with simulation. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, 2nd edition.
Vidogbena, F., Adegbidi, A., Tossou, R., Assogba-Komlan, F., Ngouajio, M., Mar-
tin, T., Simon, S., Parrot, L., and Zander, K. (2015). Control of vegetable pests
in Benin - Farmers’ preferences for eco-friendly nets as an alternative to insec-
ticides. Journal of Environmental Management, (147):95–107.
Wilson, C. and Tisdell, C. (2001). Why farmers continue to use pesticides despite
environmental, health and sustainability costs. Ecological Economics, (39):449–
462.
6 Appendix
23
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics
24
Table 8: Sensitivity to the administrative commitments and to health and envi-
ronmental risk exposures
25
